Bab el-Mandeb between Tehran and the Houthis: the power to disrupt rather than control

As tensions in the Red Sea escalate, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is once again emerging as one of the region’s most significant geopolitical flashpoints. The Houthis do not physically control the strait, and Iran does not have the same grip on shipping there as it does in the Strait of Hormuz. But control over the waterway is not the only way to determine what happens. Using missiles and drones supplied largely by Iran, the Houthis can attack ships, use them as a threat and force vessels to take longer and more expensive routes – without ever actually controlling the strait itself. To what extent can Iran use the Houthis to influence or disrupt traffic around Bab el-Mandeb without actually controlling the strait? 

Russia and China’s stance towards the Houthis adds a further layer of uncertainty and raises questions about what support the group may be receiving, either directly or via Iran. To examine these dynamics, we spoke to Yemeni researchers and experts about the nature of Iranian influence, the role of Russia and China, and the future of security in the Red Sea.

Could Bab el-Mandeb become a similar lever of power for Iran as the Strait of Hormuz?

Hisham Al-Omeisy, Senior Yemen Advisor at the European Institute of Peace, argues that Tehran has already succeeded in using the Houthis to exert influence over Bab el-Mandeb. According to him, ballistic missiles supplied by Iran have enabled the group to attack and threaten ships. He believes that Iran’s strategy is not aimed at a direct military victory, but at ‘increasing the costs for the Americans and wearing America down by protracted warfare’.

Al-Omeisy believes that the recent attacks on oil tankers are not unrelated to Iran’s strategy. ‘The Houthis’ decision to attack oil tankers at this particular time is no coincidence, but part of an Iranian plan,’ he says. According to Al-Omeisy, the Houthis are one of the three key assets that Iran can deploy in the region, alongside the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces. Al-Shabaab – active on the other side of the Red Sea and reportedly linked to the Houthis – could also further increase the pressure on the shipping route.

Other experts describe the relationship in similar terms, but draw a clearer distinction between the group’s reach and its actual control. Nasr Taha Mustafa, an adviser to the Yemeni presidency, former head of the presidential office and former chairman of the Yemeni Journalists‘ Union, says that the Houthis ’to this day‘ in the sense that they have direct access to or control over the strait. However, he says that with missiles and drones, they are capable of ’disrupting traffic through it, and even across the entire Red Sea’.

Hisham Al-Omeisy, Senior Yemen Adviser at the European Institute of Peace.

Adnan Al-Jabrani, a researcher specialising in the Houthi movement, makes the same distinction: the group ‘does not control Bab el-Mandeb, but is able to attack shipping there, just as it does in the rest of the Red Sea’. To this end, the group uses anti-ship ballistic missiles which, he claims, were acquired with Iranian assistance and can be fired from mountainous terrain far from the coast. Hamdan Alaly, a journalist and author of publications on the Houthi movement, agrees. According to him, the group does not need to directly control the strait to exert influence over it: land-based weapons and missiles can ‘damage ships and disrupt global trade’ and drive up insurance and transport costs – particularly when ships are diverted via the Cape of Good Hope.

The distinction can be summarised quite simply: to block a strait, you need to control the waterway itself; to disrupt shipping through it, you can operate from land. A single missile or drone attack may be enough to force ships to change course.

Abdulsalam Mohammed, head of the Abaad Centre for Studies and adviser to the Yemeni Ministry of Information.

The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah, are an armed Shia Islamist movement and a political and military organisation. Their leadership includes clerics who received religious and political education in North Yemen in the 1990s. They make little secret of their loyalty to Iran: huge images have been seen on the streets of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, of Iranian leaders who have been killed or targeted by US strikes, including Qassem Soleimani, as well as images of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Mustafa, who has had close ties with Yemeni political circles, says that Iran, through its support for the Houthiinsurgency in 2014 – when the group captured Sana’a – ultimately aimed to enable the Houthis to conquer the entire country and, through them, gain control over shipping traffic in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. That is one interpretation of Iran’s long-term objective; based on the evidence presented here, it cannot be regarded as an established fact regarding Iran’s current intentions.

Since the start of their attacks in November 2023, the Houthis have targeted more than a hundred commercial vessels, in one of the largest campaigns of attacks against international shipping in recent years. The attacks resulted in several vessels being sunk or disabled, including the Rubymar, Tutor, Magic Seas and Eternity C, after which the attacks resumed in 2026. On 5 August, the Houthis announced that they had attacked the Saudi oil tanker Wafa off the coast of Yanbu in the northern Red Sea with ballistic missiles; a day later, they reported an attack on the Saudi tanker Daisy in the Gulf of Aden. On 11 August, they attacked the Tihamah in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, in which four crew members were killed. On 24 August, the Saudi National Shipping Company ‘Bahri’ confirmed that its tanker Amzan had been involved in a security incident in the Red Sea; the Houthis claimed responsibility for it.

For Al-Omeisy, this illustrates the crux of the Iranian-Houthi strategy: a ship does not need to be physically stopped to cause economic repercussions. ‘The Houthis attack cargo ships or threaten to attack them,’ he says. That alone may be enough to cause ships to stop or change course, driving up the costs of transport, energy and goods – costs which, he believes, may ultimately be passed on in prices in the United States and Europe.

Who decides when to escalate the matter?

A more difficult question than whether the Houthis can disrupt shipping is to what extent they decide to do so of their own accord. Al-Omeisy sees the relationship as a means by which Tehran can use the group to exert pressure on Washington, without Iran necessarily seeking a direct war with the United States. The aim would rather be a confrontation that becomes so costly and protracted that Washington seeks a way out. Alaly goes further and calls the Houthis ‘an Iranian instrument’. He describes the relationship as ‘organic’ rather than a temporary political alliance.

That does not mean that every decision taken by the Houthis originates in Tehran. The group has its own interests and considerations within Yemen, and Iran regards its relationship with the Houthis as part of a broader regional network of partners and allies, not as a hierarchical chain of command. Nothing in the information gathered here indicates that Tehran has operational control over individual Houthi attacks. What the interviewees do consistently describe, however, is a strategic alignment of interests rather than a direct chain of command. 

Russia: courtesy, caution or cooperation?

Russia’s stance towards the Houthis has attracted particular attention amongst Yemeni researchers, especially following Russian positions in the UN Security Council which, according to some, are closer to the Houthi narrative than before. The interviewees hold widely differing views on the significance of this.

Mustafa rejects the idea that this amounts to a complete shift in Russia’s stance towards the Houthis. According to him, Moscow continues to publicly support Yemen’s internationally recognised government. He argues that any occasional sympathy for the Houthis should rather be seen as ‘a form of courtesy towards Iran and an attempt to strengthen their bilateral relationship’, particularly in view of Iran’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. He points to the decades-long relations between Russia and Yemen and considers it unlikely that Moscow would abandon its ties with the government and its allies in favour of a group that controls only part of the country.

Nasr Taha Mustafa, adviser to the Yemeni Presidency and former chairman of the Yemeni Journalists’ Union.

Al-Omeisy takes a more pragmatic view: Russia is so preoccupied with Ukraine that it is ‘too clever to get drawn into a regional war’, but may well have an interest in the Houthis continuing to exert pressure on the United States and Western countries. Al-Jabrani is even more cautious. ‘The Houthis are benefiting from Russia, but so far there is no direct evidence of this,’ he says. In his view, an indirect channel is more likely: Russian technology could find its way to the Houthis via Russian-Iranian cooperation, rather than being supplied directly by Moscow. He describes Russia’s position on the Security Council as ‘remarkable and something that deserves attention and must be monitored closely’.

Abdulsalam Mohammed, head of the Abaad Centre for Studies and an adviser to the Yemeni Ministry of Information, makes the most categorical claims. According to him, there is ‘information about training for the Houthis and about Russian weapons reaching the Houthis via intermediary countries and indirectly’, as well as about visits by Houthi leaders to Russia. These are allegations as made by him, not independently documented findings, and should be read as such. Abdulsalam further argues that Moscow may see a strategic advantage in Houthi attacks when these exhaust the United States and other Western countries in the Red Sea and – by disrupting regional oil exports – increase the demand for and price of Russian oil. That is a plausible strategic line of reasoning, but not a proven Russian objective.

With regard to the central question of this article, the Russian sources provide one key insight in particular: even if Moscow itself plays only a limited and largely diplomatic role, these sources repeatedly cite Russian-Iranian cooperation as a possible indirect channel through which the Houthis’ ability to disrupt shipping could be strengthened.

China: interests over alliances

China differs from Russia in that Beijing has kept a more visible distance from the conflict. According to Mustafa, Al-Jabrani and Alaly, China continues to officially support Yemen’s internationally recognised government. Where the interviewees differ in their views is on what may be happening behind the scenes, beyond that official position.

Al-Omeisy describes China as ‘pragmatic and focused on its commercial interests’, with Beijing’s primary concern being the safe passage of its own ships and tankers. According to him, this interest could, in principle, lead China to maintain contact with any party capable of safeguarding its trade. Al-Jabrani says that the Houthis benefit from Chinese purchases and technologies that would be difficult to obtain without intermediaries – possibly networks with links to Iran that procure and pass on equipment. Alaly argues that China maintains non-public channels of communication with the Houthis and places this within the broader rivalry between the United States and China. Abdulsalam makes the most accusatory statements: according to him, the Houthis are secretly benefiting from Chinese equipment and drones that reach them via Iranian intermediaries, and Beijing may view Houthi pressure on the United States as a way of complicating US strategy in the region.

Hamdan Alaly, journalist, writer and human rights activist.

None of these claims is supported in the material compiled here by independent evidence that the Chinese government is pursuing an official policy of arming the Houthis or deploying them against the United States. These remain interpretations by Yemeni researchers and advisers, some of whom have close ties to the internationally recognised government. This context must be taken into account when assessing their statements. What can be stated with greater certainty is more limited: Beijing has a clear commercial interest in safe passage through the Red Sea, and several interviewees believe that this interest carries greater weight in China’s considerations than any affiliation with the Houthis.

Europe is paying the price for unrest in the Red Sea

For Europe, this is not simply a conflict confined to Yemen. Bab el-Mandeb forms the southern gateway to the Red Sea, which in turn leads to the Suez Canal – the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe. Disruption to the strait therefore leads quite directly to higher transport costs, longer sailing times and economic consequences for European trade.

Al-Omeisy believes that Europe recognises the gravity of the situation, but does not have the same means of influence as the United States. Europeans ‘do not have the means to influence events on the ground’, he says, and their budgets for Yemen are limited – their ‘shadow is bigger than their size’. In his view, Europe can play a political role, but is unlikely to send troops or allocate large sums of money to alter the balance of power within Yemen.

Adnan Al-Jabrani, a researcher specialising in the Houthi movement.

Mustafa has observed a shift since 2023, as European governments have become increasingly aware of the Red Sea’s importance to trade. ‘The security of the Red Sea is exceptionally important for Europe, as it is the shortest trade route between Europe and Asia,’ he says. At the same time, he argues that Europe will have to do more to maintain its position should the conflict escalate again.

A threat that extends beyond the strait

According to Al-Omeisy, the problem does not stop at attacks on individual ships. He warns that a temporary agreement with the Houthis could lead to the problem resurfacing later, as he believes happened with piracy in the Red Sea: it was curbed by the international community, but not resolved. He also points to attempts by the Houthis to bind a new generation more closely to the movement’s ideology, which, he argues, could make the group more difficult to combat in the future. He describes the Houthis as an ‘extremist, racist and ideological’ organisation whose threat, in his view, will not be confined to Yemen. These are Al-Omeisy’s own expectations for the future, not established outcomes, and are presented here as such.

Conclusion: the battle over risk

The four experts agree on one point: the Houthis do not control Bab el-Mandeb, but they can influence security in the strait. That distinction is not a technical matter – it is precisely why this strait is so important. Iran does not need to fly its flag over Bab el-Mandeb to use the strait as a means of exerting pressure, and the Houthis do not need to close the waterway to force shipping companies to reconsider their routes. In a strait as narrow as this, the mere possibility of an attack may be enough to force a ship to sail round the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to the journey and costing millions of dollars more.

That is ultimately where the real stakes lie – not only for Iran and the Houthis, but also for the United States, Europe, China and Russia. Ultimately, the struggle over Bab el-Mandeb is not about who controls the strait. It is about who can determine the level of risk ships face when passing through it.